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This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory.
It introduces a new choice set consisting of information-contingent plans for choosing
actions and bets and subjective expected utility model with eﬀect-dependent utility
functions and action-dependent subjective probabilities which, in conjunction with the
updating of the probabilities using Bayes’ rule, gives rise to a unique prior and a set
of action-dependent posterior probabilities representing the decision maker’s prior and
posterior beliefs.
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11 Introduction
A choice-based theory of Bayesian decision making blends ﬁve key ideas. First, the pat-
terns revealed by choice are the sole evidence by which the underlying theoretical concepts
may be refuted.1 Second, the decision-maker’s evaluation of the objects of choice — payoﬀs
contingent on the realization of events — reﬂects his tastes as well as his beliefs regarding
the likelihoods of the relevant events. Third, the decision maker’s beliefs, both prior and
posterior, are measurable cognitive phenomena representable by probabilities. Forth, new
information aﬀects the decision maker’s preferences, or choice behavior, through its eﬀect on
the decision maker’s beliefs rather than his tastes. Fifth, the posterior probabilities repre-
senting the decision maker’s posterior beliefs are obtained by updating the prior probabilities
representing his prior beliefs using Bayes’ rule. By themselves these ideas do not imply that
Bayesian decision makers are expected utility maximizers.
In the wake of the seminal work of Savage (1954), it is commonplace to depict the alterna-
tives in the choice set as mappings from a state space, whose elements represent resolutions
of uncertainty, to a set of consequences. The objects of choice have the interpretation of
alternative courses of action and are referred to as acts. The two most commonly used spec-
iﬁcations of the choice set in the literature are those of Savage (1954), in whose formulation
the set of states is inﬁnite and the set of consequences arbitrary, and Anscombe and Au-
mann (1963), in whose formulation the set of states is ﬁnite and the set of consequences are
1This is an application of the revealed-preference methodology.
2lotteries with ﬁnite sets of arbitrary prizes.
The literature abounds with axiomatic theories specifying preference relations on these
choice sets whose representations involve unique subjective probabilities, interpreted as the
Bayesian prior.2 However, in all the models that invoke Savage’s analytical framework, the
uniqueness of the probabilities is due to the use of a convention maintaining that constant
acts are constant-utility acts. This convention lacks choice-theoretic meaning and, as a result,
is not refutable in the context of the revealed-preference methodology.
To grasp this claim, let S denote the set of states, C the set of consequences and F the
set of acts. Decision makers are characterized by their preference relations on F.I nS a v a g e ’ s
subjective expected utility theory, the structure of a preference relation, <, on F, depicted






where u is a real-valued (utility) function deﬁned on the consequences and π is a ﬁnitely
additive, nonatomic probability measure on S. Moreover, the utility function u is unique
up to positive linear transformation, and, given u, the subjective probability measure π is
unique.
The uniqueness of π, however, is predicated on the implicit assumption that constant
2Prominent among these theories are the expected utility models of Savage (1954), Anscombe and Aumann
(1963), and Wakker (1989), as well as the probability sophisticated choice models of Machina and Schmeidler
(1992, 1995).
3acts are constant utility acts (that is, the utility function is state-independent). As already
mentioned, this assumption is not implied by the axioms and is, therefore, devoid of be-
havioral content. In fact, there are inﬁnitely many prior probability measures consistent
with a decision maker’s prior preferences. Put diﬀerently, even if a decision maker’s beliefs
constitute a psychological phenomenon quantiﬁable by a probability measure and his choice
behavior is consistent with the axiomatic structure of expected utility theory, the proposition
that the subjective probabilities ascribed to him by Savage’s model represent the decision
maker’s beliefs is untestable. To prove this assertion, let γ be a strictly positive, bounded,
real-valued function on S, and let ¯ γ =
Z
S
γ (s)dπ (s). Then the prior preference relation,




ˆ u(f(s),s)dˆ π(s), (2)
where ˆ u(·,s)=u(·)/γ (s) and ˆ π is a ﬁnitely additive, nonatomic probability measure on S
deﬁned by ˆ π(E)=
Z
E
π(s)γ (s)ds/¯ γ, for all E ∈ 2S.3
The fact that the uniqueness of the subjective probabilities in Savage’s theory, and in
other theories that invoke Savage’s (1954) analytical framework, is not a choice-based prop-
erty of the model means that these subjective probabilities do not constitute a behavioral
foundations of Bayesian statistics.
3This point was recognized by Drèze (1987); Schervish, Seidenfeldt, and Kadane (1990); Karni (1996,
2003); Karni and Schmeidler (1993); and Nau (1995). Note also that, even if a decision maker is Bayesian
(that is, updates his preferences using Bayes’ rule), neither his prior nor his posterior beliefs, as deﬁned by
the representing probabilities, are unique.
4The popularity of Savage’s notion of subjective probabilities among economists and deci-
sion theorists is due, in part, to the elegance of the representation it aﬀo r d s ,b o t hi nt e r m so f
its mathematical formulation and the linguistic ease of describing its ingredients.4 However,
this elegance comes at a cost. To attain the separation of subjective probabilities from utili-
ties it is necessary to assume that the preference relation exhibits state independence, which
entails substantial loss of generality and limits the applicability of the model. For instance,
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) impose state-independence to decompose the terms of a sep-
arately additive representation into a product of utility and probability.5 The imposition of
substantive restrictions to attain mathematical elegance is inconsistent with good scholar-
ship. Furthermore, Karni (2008) gives an example involving the design of optimal insurance
in the presence of moral hazard, in which the insurer knows the insured’s prior preferences
and assumes, correctly, that the insured is Bayesian. The example shows that, failure to
ascribe to the insured his true prior probabilities and utilities may result in attributing to
him the wrong posterior preferences. In such case, when new information (for instance, a
study indicating a decline in the incidence of theft in the neighborhood in which the insured
resides) necessitates changing the terms of the insurance policy, the insurer may oﬀer the
insured a policy that is individually rational and incentive incompatible. More generally,
in the presence of moral hazard, correct prediction of an agent’s changing behavior by the
4Quite often in the literature, the term subjective probability is used interchangeably with the term
beliefs. Yet, as just demonstarted, this usage is hardly justiﬁed if not outright misleading. It does, however,
serve the purpose of lending the theory intuitive meaning that readers apparently ﬁnd compelling.
5The analogous axioms in Savage’s model are P3 and P4 (see Hill (2008)).
5application of Bayes rule requires that the agent be ascribed a prior that faithfully represent
his beliefs. A more meaningful notion of subjective probability, one that is a measurement
of subjective beliefs when these beliefs have structure that allows their representation by
probability measure, is developed in this paper.
Building on Karni (2006), this paper introduces a new analytical framework that in-
cludes actions, eﬀects, bets, observations, and strategies. Actions are initiatives by which
decision makers believe they can aﬀect the likely realization of eﬀects. Eﬀects are observable
realizations of eventualities on which decision makers can place bets, and which might also
be of direct concern to them. Bets are real-valued mapping on the set of eﬀects. Obser-
vations correspond to information that the decision maker may receive before choosing his
action and bet. Strategies are maps from the set of observations to the set of action-bet
pairs. In this model, decision makers are characterized by preference relations on the set
of all strategies whose axiomatic structure lends the notion of constant utility bets choice-
theoretic meaning. In other words, unlike in models that use Savage’s analytical framework,
in this model constant utility bets leave their unique signature, or trace, in the pattern of
choice. Because the constant utility bets are identiﬁa b l e ,i tp o s s i b l et od e ﬁne a unique family
of action-dependent, joint subjective probability distributions on the product set of eﬀects
and observations. Moreover, the prior probabilities are the unconditional marginal probabil-
ities on the set of eﬀects and the posterior probabilities are the distributions on the eﬀects
conditional on the observations. To my knowledge, this is the only complete choice-based
Bayesian decision theory available.
6The work which is closest to this paper is Karni (2006). In that paper, some of the
elements of the present analytical framework already appear. However, that work only
characterizes the notion of constant valuation bets involving compensating variations between
the direct utility cost associated with the actions and their impact on the probabilities of
the eﬀects. Hence, constant valuation bets are not constant utility bets. Consequently, the
uniqueness of the probability, in that work, must rely on an arbitrary normalization of the
utility functions. The two ingredients of the present theory that make it possible to identify
the constant utility bets, namely, observations and strategies, are new. The signiﬁcant of
this can hardly be overstated. It allows a choice-based deﬁnition of subjective probabilities
whose uniqueness does not rely on an arbitrary choice of a utility function, thus resolving
an, almost century old, issue ﬁrst raised by Ramsey (1931).
The model presented here accommodates eﬀect-dependent preferences, lending itself to
natural interpretations in the context of medical decision making and the analysis of life
insurance, health insurance, as well as standard portfolio and property insurance problems.
The fact that the probabilities are action dependent means that the model furnishes an
axiomatic foundation for the behavior of the principal and agent depicted in the parametrized
distribution formulation of agency theory introduced by Mirrlees (1974, 1976).
The pioneering attempt to extend the subjective expected utility model to include moral
hazard and state-dependent preferences is due to Drèze (1961,1987). Invoking the analytical
framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), he departed from their “reversal of order”
axiom, assuming instead that decision makers may strictly prefer knowing the outcome of
7a lottery before the state of nature becomes known. According to Drèze, this suggests that
the decision maker believes that he can inﬂuence the probabilities of the states. How this
inﬂuence is produced is not made explicit. The representation entails the maximization of
subjective expected utility over a convex set of subjective probability measures.6
The next section introduces the theory and the main results. Concluding remarks appear
in section 3. The proof of the main representation theorem appears in section 4.
2T h e T h e o r y
2.1 The analytical framework
Let Θ be a ﬁnite set of eﬀects, X a ﬁnite set of observations or signals, and A a connected
separable topological space whose elements are referred to as actions. Actions correspond
to initiatives (e.g., time and eﬀort) that decision makers may take to inﬂuence the likely
realization of eﬀects.
A bet is a real-valued mapping on Θ interpreted as monetary payoﬀs contingent on the
realization of the eﬀects. Let B denote the set of all bets on Θ and assume that it is endowed
with the R|Θ| topology. Denote by (b−θr) the bet obtained from b ∈ B by replacing the θ
6The model in this paper diﬀers from that of Drèze in several important respects, including the speciﬁca-
tion of the means by which a decision maker thinks he may inﬂuence the likelihood of the alternative eﬀects.
For more deatils see Karni (2006).
8coordinate of b (that is, b(θ))w i t hr. Eﬀects are analogous to Savage’s (1954) states in the
sense that they resolve the uncertainty associated with the payoﬀ of the bets. Unlike states,
however, the likely realization of eﬀects may conceivably be aﬀected by the decision maker’s
actions.7
Observations may be obtained before the choice of bets and actions, in which case they
aﬀect these choices. For example, upon learning the result of a new study concerning the
eﬀect of cholesterol level in blood on the likelihood of a heart attack, a decision maker may
adopt an exercise and diet regimen to reduce the risk of heart attack and, at the same
time, take out health insurance and life insurance policies. In this instance the new ﬁndings
correspond to observations, the diet and exercise regimens correspond to actions, the states
of health are eﬀects, and the ﬁnancial terms of an insurance policy constitute a bet on Θ.8
To model this “dynamic” aspect of the decision making process, I assume that a de-
cision maker formulates a strategy, or contingent plan, specifying the action-bet pairs to
be implemented contingent on the observations. Formally, denote by o the event “no new
information” and let ¯ X = X ∪ {o}, then strategy is a function I : ¯ X → A × B that has the
interpretation of a set of instructions specifying, for each x ∈ ¯ X, an action-bet pair to be
implemented if x is observed.9 Let I be the set of all strategies.
7It is suﬃcient, for my purpose, that the decision maker believes that he may aﬀect the likely realization
of the eﬀects by his choice of action.
8Clearly, the information aﬀorded by the new observation is conditioned by the existing regimen. The
decision problem is how to modify the existing regimen in light of the new information.
9Alternatively stated, o is a non-informative observation (that is, anticipating the representaion below,
9A decision maker is characterized by a preference relation < on I. The strict preference
relation, Â, and the indiﬀerence relation, ∼, are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <,
respectively. Denote by I−x (a,b) ∈ I the strategy in which the x coordinate of I is replaced
by (a,b). An observation, x, is essential if I−x (a,b) Â I−x (a0,b 0) for some (a,b),(a0,b 0) ∈
A × B and I ∈ I. I assume throughout that all elements of ¯ X are essential.
In the terminology of Savage (1954), ¯ X may be interpreted as a set of states and contin-
g e n tp l a n sa sa c t s .H o w e v e r ,b e c a u s et h ed e c i s i o nm a k e r ’ sb e l i e f sa b o u tt h el i k e l i h o o d so ft h e
eﬀects depend on both the actions and the observations, the preferences on action-bet pairs
are inherently observation dependent. Thus applying Savage’s state-independent axioms, P3
and P4, to < on I, makes no sense.
To grasp the role of the various ingredients of the model and set the stage for the statement
of the axioms, it is useful, at this junction, to look ahead at the representation of < on
I. The representation involves an array of continuous, eﬀect-dependent utility functions
{u(·,θ):R → R}θ∈Θ and a utility of actions function v : A → R unique up to common
positive linear transformation, and a unique family of action-dependent joint probability



















where bI(x) and aI(x) are the bet and action assigned by the strategy I to the observation
x. Furthermore, for all x ∈ ¯ X, μ(x): =
P
θ∈Θ π(x,θ | a) is independent of a. Hence the
the subjective probability distribution on the eﬀects conditional on o is the same as that under the current
information).






















where, for all x ∈ X, π(θ | x,a)=π(x,θ | a)/μ(x) is the posterior probability of θ con-
ditional on x and a, and for each a ∈ A, π (θ | o,a)= 1
1−μ(o)
P
x∈X π(x,θ | a) is the prior
probability of θ conditional a.10
In either representation the choice of strategy entails evaluation of the bets by their
expected utility. Actions enter this representation as a direct source of (dis)utility as well as
instrument by which the decision maker believes he may aﬀect the likely realizations of the
eﬀects.
2.2 Axioms and additive representation of < on I
The ﬁrst axiom is standard:
(A.1) (Weak order) < is a complete and transitive binary relation.
A topology on I is needed to deﬁne continuity of the preference relation <.R e c a l lt h a t
I =( A × B)
¯ X and let I be endowed with the product topology.11
10Describing π(·|o,a) as the prior distribution is appropriate because conditioning on o is means that
not information is obtained before a decision is taken.
11That is, the topology on I is the product topology on the Cartesian product (A × B)
| ¯ X| .
11(A.2) (Continuity) For all I ∈ I, the sets {I0 ∈ I|I0 < I} and {I0 ∈ I|I < I0} are
closed.
The next axiom, coordinate independence, is analogous to but weaker than Savage’s
(1954) sure thing principle.12
(A.3) (Coordinate independence) For all x ∈ ¯ X, I,I0 ∈ I, and (a,b),(a0,b 0) ∈ A × B,
I−x (a,b) < I0
−x(a,b) if and only if I−x (a0,b 0) < I0
−x (a0,b 0).
An array of real-valued functions (vs)s∈S is said to be a jointly cardinal additive represen-
tation for a binary relation º on a product set D = Πs∈SDs if, for all d,d0 ∈ D, d º d0 if and
only if
P
s∈S vs (ds) ≥
P
s∈S vs (d0
s), and the class of all functions that constitute an additive
representation of º consists of those arrays of functions, (ˆ vs)s∈S , for which ˆ vs = ηvs + ζs,
η>0 for all s ∈ S. The representation is continuous if the functions vs,s∈ S are continuous.
The following theorem is an application of Theorem III.4.1 in Wakker (1989):13
Theorem 1 Let I be endowed with the product topology and | ¯ X |≥ 3. Then a preference
relation < on I satisﬁes (A.1)—(A.3) if and only if there exist an array of real-valued func-
tions {w(·,·,x) | x ∈ ¯ X} on A × B that constitute a jointly cardinal, continuous, additive
representation for < .
12See Wakker (1989) for details.
13T os i m p l i f yt h ee x p o s i t i o nIs t a t et h et h e o r e mf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c h ¯ X contains at least three essential
coordinates. Additive representation when there are only two essential coordinates requires the imposition
of the hexagon condition (see Wakker [1989] theorem III.4.1).
122.3 Independent betting preferences
For every given x ∈ ¯ X,d e n o t eb y<x the induced preference relation on A × B deﬁned by
(a,b) <x (a0,b 0) if and only if I−x (a,b) < I−x (a0,b 0). The induced strict preference relation,
denoted by Âx, and the induced indiﬀerence relation, denoted by ∼x, are the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of <x, respectively.14 The induced preference relation <o is referred to as
the prior preference relation; the preference relations <x,x∈ X, are the posterior preference
relations. For each a ∈ A the preference relation <x induces a conditional preference relation
on B deﬁned as follows: for all b,b0 ∈ B,b <x
a b0 if and only if (a,b) <x (a,b0). The asymmetric
and symmetric part of <x
a are denoted by Âx
a and ∼x
a, respectively.
An eﬀect, θ, is said to be nonnull given the observation-action pair (x,a) if (b−θr) Âx
a
(b−θr0), for some b ∈ B and r,r0 ∈ R; it is null given the observation-action pair (x,a)
otherwise. Given a preference relation, <, denote by Θ(a,x) the subset of eﬀects that are
nonnull given the observation-action pair (x,a). Assume that Θ(a,o)=Θ, for all a ∈ A.
Two eﬀects, θ and θ
0, are said to be elementarily linked if there are actions a,a0 ∈ A and
observations x,x0 ∈ ¯ X such that θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ(a,x)∩Θ(a0,x 0). Two eﬀects are said to be linked
if there exists a sequence of eﬀects θ = θ0,...,θn = θ
0 such that θj and θj+1 are elementarily
linked, j =0 ,...,n − 1. The set of eﬀects, Θ, is linked if every pair of its elements is linked.
The next axiom requires that the “intensity of preferences” for monetary payoﬀsc o n t i n -
gent on any given eﬀect be independent of the action and the observation:
14For preference relations satisfaying (A.1) - (A.3), these relation are well-deﬁned.
13(A.4) (Independent betting preferences) For all (a,x),(a0,x 0) ∈ A× ¯ X,b,b0,b 00,b 000 ∈ B,









































a (b−θ,r 000) as indicating that given the action a, the observation x,
and the eﬀect θ, the intensity of the preferences of r00 over r000 is suﬃciently larger than that
of r over r0 as to reverse the preference ordering of the eﬀect-contingent payoﬀs b−θ and b0
−θ.
The axiom requires that these intensities not be contradicted when the action is a0 instead
of a and the observation is x0 instead of x.




















. The ﬁrst pair of indiﬀerences indicates
that, given a and x, the diﬀerence in the payoﬀs b and b0 contingent on the eﬀects other than
θ measures the intensity of preferences between the payoﬀs r and r0 and between r00 and










then indicates that given another
action-observation pair, a0 and x0, the intensity of preferences between the payoﬀs r and r0
contingent on θ is measured by the diﬀerence in the payoﬀst h eb e t sb00 and b000 contingent on
the eﬀects other than θ. T h ea x i o mr e q u i r e st h a t ,i nt h i sc a s e ,t h ed i ﬀerence in the payoﬀs
b00 and b000 contingent on the eﬀects other than θ is also a measure of the intensity of the
payoﬀs r00 and r000 contingent on θ. Thus the intensity of preferences between two payoﬀs
given θ is independent of the actions and the observations.
142.4 Belief consistency
To link the decision maker’s prior and posterior probabilities, the next axiom asserts that
for every a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, the prior probability of θ given a is the sum over X of the joint
probability distribution on X × Θ conditional on θ and a (that is, the prior is the marginal
probability on Θ).
Let I−o (a,b) denote the strategy that assigns the action-bet pair (a,b) to every observa-
tion other than o (that is, I−o (a,b) is a strategy such that I (x)=( a,b) for all x ∈ X).
(A.5) (Belief consistency) For every a ∈ A, I ∈ I and b,b0 ∈ B, I−o (a,b) ∼ I−o (a,b0)
if and only if I−o (a,b) ∼ I−o(a,b0).
The interpretation of axiom (A.5) is as follows. The decision maker is indiﬀerent between
two strategies that agree on X and, in the event that no new information becomes available,
call for the implementation of the alternative action-bet pairs (a,b) or (a,b0) if and only if he
is indiﬀerent between two strategies that agree on o and call for the implementation of the
same action-bet pairs (a,b) or (a,b0) regardless of the observation. Put diﬀerently, given any
action, the preferences on bets conditional on there being no new information is the same
as that when new information may not be used to select the bet. Hence, in and of itself,
information is worthless.
152.5 Constant utility bets
Constant utility bets are bets whose payoﬀso ﬀs e tt h ed i r e c ti m p a c to ft h ee ﬀects. Formally
Deﬁnition 2 Ab e t¯ b ∈ B is a constant utility bet according to < if, for all I,I0,I00,I000 ∈







































and ∩(x,a)∈X×A{b ∈ B | b ∼x
a ¯ b} =
{¯ b}.
To render the deﬁnition meaningful it is assumed that, given ¯ b, for all a,a0,a 00,a 000 ∈ A






























As in the interpretation of axiom (A.4), to understand the deﬁnition of constant utility


















as indicating that, given¯ b and x, the preferential diﬀerence between the substrategies I−x and
I0











implies that, given ¯ b, and another observation x0, the preferential
diﬀerence between the substrategies I00
−x0 and I000
−x0 is another measure the intensity of pref-
erence of a over a0. Then it must be true that it also measure the intensity of preference of
a00 over a000.
The requirement that ∩(x,a)∈X×A{b ∈ B | b ∼x
a ¯ b} = {¯ b} implicitly asserts that actions and
observations aﬀect the probabilities of the eﬀects, and that these actions and observations are
16suﬃciently rich so that ¯ b is well-deﬁned. It is worth emphasizing that the axiomatic structure
does not rule out that the decision maker believes that his choice of action does not aﬀect
the likelihoods of the eﬀects. However, the uniqueness part of deﬁnition 2, by excluding the
existence of distinct bets constant utility bets belonging to the same equivalence classes, for
all (a,x) ∈ A × X, implies that, not only does the decision maker believe in his ability to
aﬀect the likely realization of the eﬀects by his choice of action, but also that these likelihoods
depend on the observations.
To understand why this implies that ¯ b is a constant utility bet recall that, in general,
actions aﬀect decision makers in two ways: directly through their utility cost and indirectly
by altering the probabilities of the eﬀects. Moreover, only the indirect impact depends on
the observations. The deﬁnition requires that, given ¯ b, the intensity of the preferences over
the actions be observation-independent. This means that the indirect inﬂuence of the actions
is neutralized, which can happen only if the utility associated with ¯ b is invariable across the
eﬀects.
Let Bcu (<) be a subset of all constant utility bets according to < . In general, this set
may be empty. This is the case if the range of the utility of the monetary payoﬀsa c r o s s
eﬀects do not overlap. Here I am concerned with the case in which Bcu (<) is nonempty. The
set Bcu (<) is said to be inclusive if for every (x,a) ∈ X ×A and b ∈ B there is ¯ b ∈ Bcu (<)
such that b ∼x
a ¯ b.15
15Inclusiveness of Bcu (<) simpliﬁes the exposition. For existence and uniqueness of the probabilities in
the main result below it is enough that for every given x and a, Bcu (<) contains at least two bets.
17T h en e x ta x i o mr e q u i r e st h a tt h et r a d e - o ﬀs between the actions and the substrategies
that ﬁgure in deﬁnition 2 are independent of the constant utility bets.


















Finally, it is also required that the direct eﬀect (that is, cost) of actions, measured by
the preferential diﬀerence between ¯ b and ¯ b0 in Bcu (<), be independent of the observation.













2.6 The main representation theorem
The next theorem asserts the existence of subjective expected utility representation of the
preference relation < on I, and characterizes the uniqueness properties of its constituent




denote the action-bet pair





Theorem 3 Let < be a preference relation on I and suppose that Bcu (<) is inclusive, then:
(a) The following two conditions are equivalent:
(a.i) < satisﬁes (A.1)—(A.7)
18(a.ii) there exist continuous, real-valued functions {u(·,θ) | θ ∈ Θ} on R and v ∈ RA,

























θ∈Θ π(x,θ | a) for all x ∈ ¯ X is independent of a, π (θ | x,a)=π(x,θ | a)/μ(x)
for all (x,a) ∈ X × A, π (θ | o,a)= 1
1−μ(o)
P
x∈X π(x,θ | a) for all a ∈ A, and, for every






, for all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) If {ˆ u(·,θ) | θ ∈ Θ}, ˆ v ∈ RA and {ˆ π(·,·|a) | a ∈ A} is another set of utilities and
a family of joint probability measures representing < in the sense of (5), then ˆ π(·,·|a)=
π(·,·|a) for every a ∈ A and there are numbers m>0 and k,k0 such that ˆ u(·,θ)=
mˆ u(·,θ)+k, θ∈ Θ and ˆ v = mv + k0.
Although the joint probability distributions π(·,·|a),a∈ A depend on the actions, the
distribution μ is independent of a. This is consistent with the formulation of the decision
problem according to which the choice of actions is contingent on the observations. In
other words, if new information in the form of an observation becomes available, it precedes
the choice of action. Consequently, the dependence of the joint probability distributions
π(·,·|a) on a captures solely the decision maker’s beliefs about his ability to inﬂuence the
likelihood of the eﬀects by his choice of action.16
16If an action-eﬀect pair are already “in eﬀect” when new information arrives, they constitute a default
course of action. In such instance, the interpretation of the decision at hand is possible choice of new action
19The key to obtaining the uniqueness of the joint probability distributions π(·,·|a),a∈ A
is the existence and uniqueness of constant utility bets. The deﬁnition of these bets requires,
in turn, that the decision maker perceives the likelihoods of the eﬀects to depends on both his
actions and the observations. It is worth underscoring that, neither actions nor observations
can be dispense with and still obtain a choice-based deﬁnition of if constant utility bets.
Unlike the subjective probability in the theory of Savage (1954) (and in all other theories
that invoke Savage’s analytical framework) whose uniqueness is predicated on an arbitrary
speciﬁcation of the utility function, the uniqueness of the probabilities in this theory is
entirely choice based. In particular, the theory of this paper is immune to the critique of
Savage’s theory in the introduction (that is, it does not allow the multiplication of the joint
probabilities by positive numbers and dividing the utility functions by the same numbers
and renormalizing to obtain an equivalent representation).
and bet. For example, a modiﬁcation of a diet regimen coupled with a possible change of life insurance
policy.
203 Concluding Remarks
3.1 Eﬀect-independent preferences and eﬀect-independent utility
functions
The choice-based Bayesian decision theory presented in this paper includes, as a special case,
eﬀect-independent preferences. In particular, following Karni (2006), eﬀect independent
preferences is captured by the following axiom:
(A.8) Eﬀect-independent betting preferences For all x ∈ ¯ X, a ∈ A, b,b0,b 00,b 000 ∈ B,
θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ, and r,r0,r 00r000 ∈ R, if (b0
−θ,r) <x










The interpretation of this axiom is analogous to that of action-independent betting pref-
erences. The preferences (b0
−θ,r 0) <x
a (b−θ,r) and (b−θ,r 00) <x
a (b0
−θ,r 000) indicate that, for
every given (a,x), the “intensity” of the preference for r00 over r000 given the eﬀect θ is suﬃ-
ciently greater than that of r over r0 as to reverse the order of preference between the payoﬀs
b0
−θ and b−θ.E ﬀect independence requires that these intensities not be contradicted by the
preferences between the same payoﬀsg i v e na n yo t h e re ﬀect θ.
Adding axiom (A.8) to the hypothesis of Theorem 3 implies that the utility function
that ﬁgures in the representation takes the form u(b(θ),θ)=t(θ)u(b(θ)) + s(θ), where
t(θ) > 0. In other words, even if the preference relation exhibits eﬀect-independence over
21bets, the utility function may still display eﬀect dependence, in the form of the additive and
multiplicative coeﬃcient. Thus, eﬀects may impact the decision maker’s well-being without
necessarily aﬀecting his risk preferences.
Let Bc be the subset of constant bets (that is, trivial bets with the same payoﬀ regardless
of the eﬀect that obtains). If the set of constant utility bets coincides with the set of
constant bets (that is, Bc = Bcu (<)), then the utility function is eﬀect independent (that
is, u(b(θ),θ)=u(b(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ). The implicit assumption that the set of constant
utility bets coincides with the set of constant bets is the convention invoked by the standard
subjective utility models. Unlike in those models, however, in the theory of this paper, this
assumption is a testable hypothesis.
3.2 Conditional preferences and dynamic consistency
The speciﬁcation of the decision problem implies that, before the decision maker chooses an
action-bet pair, either no informative signal arrives (that is, the observation is o)o rn e w
informative signal arrives in the form of an observation x ∈ X. One way or another, given






be binary relations on A × B depicting the decision maker’s choice behavior





by the name ex-post preference relations.
Dynamic consistency requires that at each x ∈ ¯ X, the decision maker implements his
plan of action envisioned for that contingency by the original strategy. Formally,






on A × B if the posterior preference relations (<x)x∈ ¯ X satisfy
<x= ˆ <
x
for all x ∈ ¯ X.
The following is an immediate implication of Theorem 3.
Corollary 5 Let < be preference relation on I satisfying (A.1)—(A.7) and suppose that











π(θ | x,a)u(b(θ),θ)+v(a), (6)
where {u(·,θ) | θ ∈ Θ} and {π(·|x,a) | x ∈ ¯ X,a ∈ A} are the utility functions and
conditional subjective probabilities that appear in the representation (5).
For every a ∈ A the subjective action-contingent prior on Θ is π(·|o,a) and the sub-
jective action-contingent posteriors on Θ are π(·|x,a),x∈ X. T h es u b j e c t i v ea c t i o n -
dependent prior is the marginal distribution on Θ induced by the distribution on X × Θ,
and the subjective action-dependent posteriors are obtained from the action-contingent joint
distribution on X × Θ by conditioning on the observation.
4P r o o f o f T h e o r e m 3
For expository convenience, I write Bcu instead of Bcu (<).
23(a) (a.i) ⇒ (a.ii). Suppose that < on I satisﬁes (A.1)—(A.7) and Bcu is inclusive. By









where w(.,.,x),x∈ ¯ X are jointly cardinal, continuous, real-valued functions.
Since < satisﬁes (A.4), Lemmas 4 and 5 in Karni (2006) applied to <x, x ∈ ¯ X, and
Theorem III.4.1 in Wakker (1989) imply that for every (a,x) ∈ A × ¯ X such that Θ(a,x)
contains at least two eﬀects, there exist array of functions {v(a,x) (·;θ):R → R | θ ∈ Θ}
that constitute a jointly cardinal, continuous additive representation of <x
a on B. Moreover,
by the proof of Lemma 6 in Karni (2006), < satisﬁes (A.1)—(A.4) if and only if, for every
(a,x),(a0,x 0) ∈ A × ¯ X such that Θ(a,x) ∩ Θ(a0,x 0) 6= ∅ and θ ∈ Θ(a,x) ∩ Θ(a0,x 0), there
exist β((a0,x0),(a,x),θ) > 0 and α((a0,x0),(a,x),θ) satisfying v(a0,x0) (·,θ)=β((a0,x0),(a,x),θ)v(a,x) (·,θ)+
α((a0,x0),(a,x),θ).17
Fix ˆ a ∈ A and deﬁne u(·,θ)=v(ˆ a,o) (·,θ),λ (a,x;θ)=β((a,x),(ˆ a,o),θ) and α(a,x,θ)=
α((a,x),(ˆ a,o),θ) for all a ∈ A, x ∈ ¯ X, and θ ∈ Θ. For every given (a,x) ∈ A × ¯ X, w(a,b,x)
represents <x








where H is a continuous, increasing function.
Consider next the restriction of < to (A × Bcu)
¯ X .
17By deﬁnition, for all (a,x) and θ, β((a,x),(a,x),θ) =1and α((a,x),(a,x),θ) =0 .
24Lemma 6 There exist a function U : A × Bcu → R, ξ ∈ R
| ¯ X|













+ ζ (x). (9)
Proof: Let I,I0,I00,I000 ∈ I,a , a 0,a 00,a 000 ∈ A and ¯ b be as in deﬁnition 2. Then, for all





























































































































































































































= φ(x,x0,¯ b) ◦w
¡
·,¯ b,x0¢
. Axiom (A.7) with
¯ b = ¯ b0 imply that it is monotonic increasing. Then φ(x,x0,¯ b) is continuous. Moreover, equations
(14) and (15) in conjunction with Lemma 4.4 in Wakker (1987) imply that φ(x,x0,¯ b) is aﬃne.
Let β(x,o,¯ b) > 0 and δ(x,o,¯ b) denote, respectively, the multiplicative and additive coeﬃ-
cients corresponding to φ(x,o,¯ b), where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of φ(x,o,¯ b).










































for all ¯ b,¯ b0 ∈ Bcu. Thus, for all x ∈ ¯ X and ¯ b,¯ b0 ∈ Bcu,β (x,o,¯ b) = β(x,o,¯ b0) := ξ (x) > 0.










































+ δ(x,o,¯ b0). (18)
Thus δ(x,o,¯ b) = δ(x,o,¯ b0).
By this argument and continuity (A.2) the conclusion can be extended to Bcu. Let
δ(x,o,¯ b) := ζ (x) for all ¯ b ∈ Bcu.















+ ζ (x),ξ (x) > 0. (19)
26This completes the proof of Lemma 6. ♣












































+ ζ (x), (21)


























ξ(x) := ϕ(a) and
c(a): =κ(a)ϕ(a) for all a ∈ A and suppose that (22) holds.




















Hence c(a)=c(a0)=c for all a,a0 ∈ A.
27Normalize u so that c =1 . Then equation (20) follows from equations (21) and (22).
(Necessity) Multiply and divide the ﬁrst argument of H by ξ (x) > 0. Equation (20) may



































ξ(x) then, for every given (a,x) ∈ A × X



















































































is independent of x. However, because <x
a6=<x0
a for all a and some x,x0 ∈ ¯ X, in general,
λ(a,x,θ)/ξ (x) is not independent of θ. Moreover, because ˆ α(a,x)/ξ (x) is independent of




must be independent of θ and
P
θ∈Θ λ(a,x,θ)/ξ (x): =ϕ(a) be independent
of x. Moreover, because the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (26) is independent of x,
28ˆ α(a,x)/ξ (x) must also be independent of x. Finally, by deﬁnition, ¯ b t h eu n i q u ee l e m e n ti n
its equivalence class that has the property that u
¡¯ b(θ),θ
¢
is independent of θ.

















































But, by Lemma 7,
P
θ∈Θ λ(a,x,θ)=ξ (x)ϕ(a). Hence, by the inclusivity of Bcu, the



























For all x ∈ X,a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, deﬁne the joint subjective probability distribution on





















x0∈ ¯ X ξ (x0)
. (31)




x0∈ ¯ X ξ (x0)
. (32)
29Then the subjective probability of x is given by the marginal distribution on X induced by
the joint distributions π(·,·|a) on X × Θ and is independent of a.











































































This implies that π(θ | o,a)=
P
x∈X μ(x)π(θ | x,a)/[1 − μ(0)].
(If π(θ | o,a) >
P
x∈X μ(x)π(θ | x,a)/[1 − μ(0)] for some θ and μ(o)π(θ
0 | o,a) <
P
x∈X μ(x)π(θ
0 | x,a)/[1 − μ(0)] for some θ









for all ˆ θ ∈ Θ − {θ}, ˆ b0 (θ
0) >b 0 (θ







































But this contradicts (A.5).)
(a.ii) ⇒ (a.i). The necessity of (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) follows from Theorem 1. To




















































































































































for all θ ∈ Θ then ¯ b ∈ Bcu.S u p p o s e






























representation (7) implies that
X
ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x}
w
¡











ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x}
w
¡












ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x}
w
¡












ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x}
w
¡













ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x0}
w
¡













ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x0}
w
¡



























aI000(ˆ x),b I000(ˆ x), ˆ x
¢¤
μ(x0)




ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x0}
w
¡








ˆ x∈ ¯ X−{x0}
w
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and ¯ b ∈ Bcu.
To show the necessity of (A.5) let a ∈ A, I ∈ I and b,b0 ∈ B, by the representation








But π(θ | o,a)=
P














But (54) is valid if and only if I−o (a,b) ∼ I−o (a,b0).






















































































. This completes the proof of part (a).
(b) Suppose, by way of negation, that there exist continuous, real-valued functions
{˜ u(·,θ) | θ ∈ Θ} on R, ˜ v ∈ RA and, for every a ∈ A, there is a joint probability mea-
sure ˜ π(·,·|a) on ¯ X ×Θ, distinct from those that ﬁgure in the representation (5), such that
























θ∈Θ ˜ π(x,θ | a) for all x ∈ ¯ X, and ˜ π(θ | x,a)=˜ π(x,θ | a)/˜ μ(x) for all
(θ,x,a) ∈ Θ × X × A.



























34Hence, by (5), ˜ u(b(θ),θ)=u(b(θ),θ)/˜ γ (θ,x,a)κ(x) and ˜ v(a)=v(a)/κ(x). The second
equality implies that κ(x)=κ for all x ∈ ¯ X. Consequently, the ﬁrst inequality implies that




























/γ (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, ˆ b ∼x
a ¯ b for all
(x,a) ∈ ¯ X × A, and, by deﬁnition 2, ˆ b ∈ Bcu. Moreover, if γ (·) is not a constant function
















π(θ,x | a)=γ. (62)
Hence, ˜ π(θ,x | a)=π(θ,x | a) for all (θ,x) ∈ Θ × ¯ X and a ∈ A.









Hence, by the uniqueness part of Theorem 1, {˜ u(·,θ)}θ∈Θ and ˜ v ∈ RA must satisfy
X
θ∈Θ






+ K (x), (64)
where m>0. Clearly, this is the case if ˜ u(·,θ)=mu(·,θ)+k and ˜ v = mv + k0.
Suppose that ˜ u(·,θ)=mu(·,θ)+k, ˜ v = m0v + k0 and, without loss of generality, let
































0 [v(a) − v(a
0)] = ˜ v(a) − ˜ v(a
0). (66)
Hence ˜ u(·,θ) and ˜ v do not represent < .
Consider next ˜ u(·,θ)=mu(·,θ)+k(θ), where k(·) is not a constant function. Let
¯ k(x,a)=
P







£¯ k(x,a) − ¯ k(x,a0)
¤
















£¯ k(x,a) − ¯ k(x,a
0)
¤
6= m[v(a) − v(a
0)] = ˜ v(a) − ˜ v(a
0).
Hence ˜ u(·,θ) and ˜ v do not represent < .
If ˜ v(a)=mv(a)+k0 (a), where k0(·) is not a constant function then, by a similar
argument, ˜ u(·,θ) and ˜ v do not represent < . ¥
36References
[1] Anscombe, F., and R. Aumann. 1963. A deﬁnition of subjective probability, Annals of
Mathematical Statistics 34, 199-205.
[2] Drèze, J. H. 1961. Les fondements logiques de l’utilite cardinale et de la probabilite
subjective. La Decision, Colloques Internationaux de CNRS, 73-87.
[3] Drèze, J. H. 1987. Decision Theory with Moral Hazard and State-Dependent Prefer-
ences, in Drèze, J. H. Essays on Economic Decisions Under Uncertainty. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[4] Hill, B. 2008. An additive separable representation in the Savage’s framework. unpub-
lished manuscript.
[5] Karni, E. 1996. Probabilities and Beliefs. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 13, 249-262.
[6] Karni, E. 2006. Subjective Expected Utility Theory without States of the World. Journal
of Mathematical Economics 42, 325 - 342.
[7] Karni, E. 2008. On optimal insurance in the presence of moral hazard. Geneva Risk and
Insurance Review, 33, 1 - 18.
[8] Karni, E. and D. Schmeidler. 1993. On the uniqueness of subjective probabilities. Eco-
nomic Theory 3, 267-277.
[9] Machina, M. J., Schmeidler, D. 1992. A more robust deﬁnition of subjective probability,
Econometrica 60, 745—780.
37[10] Machina, M. J., Schmeidler, D. 1995. Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple conditions for
probabilistically sophisticated choice, Journal of Economic Theory 67, 106-128.
[11] Mirrlees, J. 1974. Notes on welfare economics, information and uncertainty. In M. Balch,
McFadden, D. and Wu S. (eds.) Essays in economic behavior under uncertainty. Ams-
terdam: North Holland.
[12] Mirrlees, J. 1976. The optimal structure of authority and incentives within an organi-
zation. The Bell J. of Economics 7, 105-113.
[13] Nau, Robert F. 1995. Coherent Decision Analysis with Inseparable Probabilities and
Utilities, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 10, 71-91.
[14] Ramsey, F. P. 1931. Truth and probability. In The Foundations of Mathematics and
Other Logical Essays. K. Paul, Trench, Truber and Co. London.
[15] Savage, L. J. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. John Wiley and Sons, New York.
[16] Schervish, M., J., T. Seidenfeldt and J. B. Kadane. 1990. State-Dependent Utilities.
Journal of American Statistical Association 85, 840-847.
[17] Wakker, P. P. 1987. Subjective probabilities for state dependent continuous utility.
Mathematical Social Sciences 14, 289-298.
[18] Wakker, P. P. 1989. Additive Representations of Preferences. Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht.
38